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Abstract
This paper calibrates the Roeger-Varga-Veld (2008) micro-founded DSGE model with en-
dogenous growth for all EU member states using country specic structural characteristics and
employs the individual country models to analyse the macroeconomic impact of various struc-
tural reforms. We use the country models to analyse the costs and benets of reforms in terms
of scal policy instruments such as taxes, benets, subsidies and administrative costs faced
by rms. Our results conrm the benecial e¤ects of various structural reforms, however the
e¤ects show a large variation across the member states. We employ multiple-regression analysis
to explore the most important factors driving the di¤erences within our simulation results. We
nd that less R&D intensive countries would benet the most from R&D promoting and skill-
upgrading policies. We also nd that shifting from labour to consumption taxes, reducing the
benet replacement rate and relieving the administrative entry barriers are the most e¤ective
measures in those countries which have high labour taxes and entry barriers.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we calibrate the semi-endogenous DSGE model described in Roeger et al. (2008) for all
EU member states. We then use the model to analyse the reform scenarios discussed in Roeger et al.
(2008): increasing knowledge investment, removing entry barriers in certain markets, addressing
nancial market imperfections, increasing the employment of low-skilled workers and changing the
skill composition of the labour force. The Roeger et al. (2008) model is an extension of the European
Commissions QUEST III model with endogenous technological change, which is su¢ ciently detailed
to be able to address the main areas of structural reforms1 . The behavioural equations of the
model are derived from intertemporal optimisation under technological, institutional and budgetary
constraints subject to nominal, real and nancial frictions. Technological change is semi-endogenous
using the Jones (1995) product-variety framework where investment in R&D is a result of the
intertemporal optimisation decision of economic agents. The original Roeger et al. (2008) model
has been applied in various simulation exercises concerning structural reform policy scenarios (see
Roeger et al. 2009a and 2009b) and has been extended in multicountry environment with human
capital formation in order to assess the impact of the EU Structural and Cohesion Funds in the
member states (Varga and int Veld 2009a and 2009b).
The e¤ects of structural reforms show large variations across the member states in our simulation
experiments. We employ multiple-regression analysis to explore the most important factors driving
the di¤erences between the country-specic simulation results. We nd that less R&D intensive
countries would benet the most from R&D promoting and skill-upgrading policies. We also conrm
the nding of Roeger et al. (2008) that the e¤ect of reducing price mark-ups is not unambiguous and
depends on the sector in which it occurs. In Jones (1995) semi-endogenous framework the mark-ups
in the intermediate goods sector cover the costs associated with acquiring a patent when entering
the market, therefore reducing mark-ups can have a negative impact on growth and employment
if it reduces the entry-rate of new rms. We also nd that shifting from labour to consumption
taxes, reducing the benet replacement rate and relieving the administrative entry barriers are the
most e¤ective in those countries which face high labour taxes, low employment rates and high entry
barriers.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 contains a detailed description of the model. Section
2 discusses calibration and estimation of structural parameters. Section 3 then shows the properties
of the model by presenting various reform scenarios for the member states and attempts to explore
the underlying di¤erences across the countries. The nal section concludes.
2 Model calibration
The structure of the model is taken from Roeger et al. (2008). Each country model is a small, open
economy model with representative households, nal and intermediate goods producing rms, a
research industry, a monetary and a scal authority2 . Final goods sector rms produce di¤erentiated
goods which are imperfect substitutes for foreign goods. Final good producers use a composite
of intermediate goods and three types of labour (low-, medium-, and high-skilled). Households
purchase the patents of designs invented by the R&D sector and license them to the intermediate
goods producing rms. The intermediate sector is composed of monopolistically competitive rms
which make intermediate products from rented capital input using the designs. The production of
new designs takes place in the research industry, employing high skilled labour and making use of
the existing stock of domestic and foreign ideas. Technological change is modelled as increasing
product variety ( Jones (1995) and 2005). Throughout the next sections we assume the reader
is familiar with the model, for the detailed model description see the Appendix or Roeger et al.
(2008).
1The QUEST III model is a DSGE model employed in the Directorate-General Economic and Financial A¤airs
of the European Commission for quantitative policy analysis (see Ratto et al. (2009)).
2Varga and in t Veld (2009a) link the individual country models into a 27 region multicountry model to analyse
the macro-economic impact of Structural and Cohesion Funds spendings on the member states.
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2.1 Goods Market
Following Roeger et al. (2009a), we consider the intermediate sector as the manufacturing sector
and the nal goods sector as the aggregate of all sectors without manufacturing. The manufacturing
sector resembles the intermediate sector as this sector is more R&D and patent intensive, and a
large fraction of manufacturing supplies innovative goods. Final goods sectors, including services,
on the other hand are typically not subject to large (patented) innovations but rely on organisational
changes partly in order to adapt to the new technologies supplied by the manufacturing sector (e.g.
ICT driven productivity increase in the retail and banking sectors).
2.1.1 Mark ups
The two sectors di¤er in the degree of competition, with manufacturing showing smaller mark
ups compared to nal goods sectors (see Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008)). Mark ups are
obtained from the EUKLEMS database using the method suggested by Roeger (1995). Due to
data restrictions these estimates were available for only ten of the old member states, therefore we
imposed the EU average calculated from the available results for the rest of the EU countries3 . The
results on the calibrated cross country di¤erences in the level of mark ups are interesting since they
suggest a positive link between the level of intermediate mark ups and R&D investment. This was
also suggested by Oliveira Martins and Price (2004) demonstrating that sectors with high R&D
intensities tend to have higher mark ups. As shown in Roeger et al. (2009a)4 , the model suggests
that lower mark ups in the nal goods sector and higher mark ups in the intermediate sector tend
to increase R&D intensities, something which we can also observe across the calibrated country
models. Figure 1 shows a small negative correlation between R&D intensities and nal goods mark
ups, while Figure 2 reveals a somewhat larger positive correlation between R&D intensities and the
mark ups in the intermediate goods sector.
2.1.2 Entry barriers
We did not nd appropriate estimates on entry barriers for specic sectors, therefore we rely on the
aggregate estimates provided by Djankov et al. (2002) who estimate the costs of procedures and
time that a start-up must bear before the rm can operate legally. This information is directly used
for the calibration of the entry cost parameter in the model. The average entry cost per rm is
estimated to be around 66 percent of GDP per capita in the whole sample. Cross country variation
is large and ranges from 3 percent of per capita GDP for the UK to above 100 percent of per capita
GDP in Hungary.
2.2 R&D sector
Empirical evidence on output elasticities of R&D production has recently been provided by Bottazzi
and Peri (2007). Concerning the subsidies to R&D investments we use the empirical evidence
provided by Warda (2006) based on the B-index formula5 . The growth rate of ideas were obtained
from Pessoa (2005) with the assumption of a 5% obsolescence rate. In our model the R&D elasticity
of research labour () is determined by the wage cost share in the total R&D spending. The
driving equation system of the semi-endogenous technological change in discrete time setting can
be summarized as
At = A
w
t 1
At 1
 
LHAt

(a)
3During the calibration we found that for several countries the imposed intermediate mark ups would imply too
high risk-premium on the intangible capitals, in some cases over 40% per year. To solve this problem, we lowered
the intermediate mark-ups so that the intangible riks premia falls around or below 10% per annum, while trying to
keep the nal goods mark ups at their precalibrated level via changing the xed cost term of production (FCY).
4See the derivation of the steady-state R&D share in Appendix 1 of Roeger et al. (2009a).
5See Appendix B of Roeger et al. (2008) for more details on the B-index and how it relates to tax parameters in
the model.
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Figure 1: R&D intensities and nal goods mark ups (average over 2003-2007)
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Figure 2: R&D intensities and intermediate goods mark ups (average over 2003-2007)
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1 + gA = (1 + gn)

1   (b)
  PAt At =WHt  LHAt (c)
rdit =
PAt gAAt 1
PtYt
(d)
iA;tP
A
t + (iA;t + A;t)FCA = t; where t =  (1  ) (1  )
Yt
At
(e)
iA =
(1  A)(it   At+1 + A)  tKA
(1  tK) + rp
A
t (f)
Kt = Atxt (g)
The rst equation is the spillover-augmented version of Jones (1995) R&D production. Equation
(b) states the balanced-growth relationship between the growth of ideas gA(= gAw) and population
gn, equation (c) is the rst order condition of R&D production, equation (d) denes R&D-intensity:
total R&D expenditure of the intermediate sector in percentage of GDP. Equation (e) states the
free-entry condition between the prot of the intermediate sector (t), and the per unit price of R&D
inventions (PA) and the xed (entry) cost FCA. Equation (f) denes the rental rate of intangible
capital which takes into account that households pay income tax at rate tKt on the period return of
intangibles and they receive tax subsidies at rate A. Since one unit of capital is used to produce
one unit of intermediate good (xt), equation (g) states the identity between the total intermediate
goods production and physical capital under symmetric equilibrium.
In the rst step of the calibration of knowledge parameters, we set the level of domestic stock
of knowledge (A) at one. Although we do not have direct estimates of , $,  and  for each
country respectively, we can use the existing literature and the model restrictions to get calibrated
values for them. Data on the R&D share of labour (LHAt ) and on the R&D intensity

PAt A
D
t
PtYt

is obtained from EUROSTAT, the values of gA and gn are given in our baseline model6 . Note
that in our model the output elasticity of research labour () corresponds to the wage share of
R&D labour in the total R&D spending (equation c). These values together with the restrictions
of the balanced growth dynamics and other variables of the baseline pin down PA. In order to
set  and $ we rst express the sum of these two parameters from equation (b), then we use the
estimated long-term relationship between  and  from Bottazzi and Peri (2007) to approximate $
separately. The authors do not estimate directly  and $, however their estimated cointegration
vector contains two coe¢ cients  and , satisfying the following theoretical restrictions between the
long-term coe¢ cients of ,  and $:
 =
long term
1  long term
and
 =
$long term
1  long term
:
The estimated values for these two coe¢ cients show fairly big variations under the di¤erent re-
gressions, and it might be inadequate to apply these long-term coe¢ cients on our "contemporary"
specication. However the ratios of these two coe¢ cients  =
$long term
long term
vary less, furthermore,
imposing the ratio of the long-term parameters instead of their exact values is also less restrictive7 .
In the last step we subtract this value from the sum of  and $ as we calculated from equation
(b) earlier. Finally, we normalize the stock of foreign ideas to one and therefore  can be obtained
from expression (a).
The parameters in intermediate goods production are calibrated according to the entry costs
estimations of Djankov et al. (2002), and the estimations for R&D related subsidies (A) in Warda
6Pessoa (2005) provides estimates for the growth of patents or ideas in various OECD countries at an average of
gA = 0:057. The population growth gn is obtained from EUKLEMS potential output calculations.
7We use the estimation results without the US in the sample.
5
Figure 3: R&D intensity (average over 2003-2007) and entry barriers (2002)
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(2006). Given the stock of domestic ideas (At), equation (g) pins down the per rm quantity of
intermediate goods production. The prot of a representative intermediate rm is determined by
its production and the net mark-up of the sector8 . All other variables given, the arbitrage equation
(e) gives the rental rate of intangible capital, iAt . The B-indices published in Warda (2006) can be
applied to calibrate A and tK . Finally, we use the denition of equation (f) to obtain as residual
the calibrated approximation of the risk-premium on intangibles, rpAt :
rpAt =
 (1  ) (1  ) YtAt   A;tFCA
PAt + FCA
  (1  
A)(it   At+1 + A)  tKA
(1  tK)
Figures 3 and 4 demonstrates that countries with higher entry barriers and higher calibrated
risk premia on intangibles tend to have lower R&D intensities, while Figure 5 show a strong positive
correlation between R&D intensities and research labour inputs. Strikingly in all comparisons new
member states are typically situated on the bottom part of the plots with low R&D intensities, high
levels of entry barriers and risk premia while the technology leaders Sweden, Finland, Denmark and
Germany are in the top corners with high R&D intensities and low levels of R&D barriers.
2.3 Labour market
We use information from our estimation of the core QUEST III model (see Ratto et al. (2009))
to calibrate the parameters of the utility function, labour supply elasticity and the frictional pa-
rameters. Labour force is disaggregated into three skill groups: low-, medium- and high-skilled
labour. We dene high skilled workers as that segment of labour force that can potentially be
employed in the R&D sector, i.e. engineers and natural scientists. Our denition of low-skilled
8We use the net mark-up of the manufacturing sector calculated in EUKLEMS to obtain , the inverse of the
gross mark-up in the intermediate sector.
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Figure 4: R&D intensity and risk premium on intangible capital (average over 2003-2007)
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Figure 5: R&D intensity and research labour (average over 2003-2007)
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Figure 6: Population shares (OMS, average over 2003-2007)
Source: EUROSTAT
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corresponds to the standard classication of ISCED 0-2 education levels and the rest of the labour
force is considered as medium-skilled. Data on skill-specic population shares, participation rates
and wage-premia are obtained from OECD (2006), the Labour Force Survey and Science and Tech-
nology databases of EUROSTAT. The comparison of skill-shares across countries (Figures 6 and 7)
shows that the share of high-skilled varies less compared to the other two skill-categories. Malta
and Portugal and to a lesser extent Spain and Italy have high shares of low-skilled labour force than
other old and new member states. Although the elasticity of substitution between di¤erent labour
types (L) is one of the major issue addressed in the labour economics literature, to our knowledge
elasticities of substitution for our three types of skills are not estimated in the literature. Therefore
we set L at 2, which is at the upper bound of the current estimates (Katz and Murphy (1992)).
Given the e¢ ciency of low-skilled, the other e¢ ciency units are restricted by the labour demand
equations which imply the following relationship between wages, labour-types and e¢ ciency units:
efm =

wm
wl
 L
L 1

smLm
slLl
 1
L 1
efl
efh =

wh
wm
 L
L 1

shLh   LA
smLm
 1
L 1
efm
Note that these e¢ ciencies are proportional to the relative population shares and to the low-
skilled e¢ ciency level, efl. For the calibration exercise we set efl so that it satises the production
function equation. The benet replacement rate (bs) is set at 30% for the old member states and
40% for the new member states, while c = 1 and w = 0 (i.e. the benet replacement rate is
indexed to consumer prices). Finally, the inverse elasticity of labour wrt. wages () takes the value
 5 for all countries in each skill-group.
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Figure 7: Population shares (NMS, average over 2003-2007)
Source: EUROSTAT
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2.4 Taxation
Corporate tax rates and the calculated tax-credits (tK and A) are taken from Warda (2006) and
we use DG TAXUD and Eurostat data to set the tax-rate on consumption (tC) and transfer-shares
(tr) respectively. Finally, we calibrate the total tax burden on labour (tL) so that the government
budget is consistent with the 2003-2006 government debt averages. Figure 8 shows the expected
negative correlation between labour taxes and employment rates. It is worth noting that as a result
of the calibration we obtain a somewhat negative correlation between indirect and direct taxation;
countries with higher labour taxes tend to have lower taxes on consumption and vice versa (Figure
9). The calibration of the individual country models is detailed in the Appendix (Tables 1 and 2)9 .
9For each variable which is obtained from statistical resources we take the average over the period of 2003-2007
whenever it is possible.
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Figure 8: Labour taxes and employment rates (average over 2003-2007)
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Figure 9: Labour vs. consumption taxes (average over 2003-2007)
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3 Scenarios of reforms
This section presents illustrative scenarios of structural reforms and their e¤ects on the economy
using the country models. The simulations we consider are the same as in Roeger et al. (2008) and
they consist of R&D promoting policies, product market reforms lowering capital costs, xed costs,
entry barriers and mark-ups, labour market reforms such as tax shifts, changes to benet generosity
and changes in skill composition. More precisely, the reform scenarios considered are the following:
1. Raising R&D through subsidies: tax-credits and wage subsidies;
2. Reducing product market mark-ups;
3. Reducing capital costs;
4. Reduction in xed costs;
5. Exogenous productivity shock;
6. Reducing wage mark-ups;
7. Tax shifts: from labour to consumption and from low- to high-skilled;
8. Reducing benet generosity;
9. Raising human capital.
For each reform scenario, we compare the simulation results across countries and explore the
reasons behind the di¤erences by carrying out multiple regressions on the main underlying para-
meters/variables. We analyse simulation results for GDP and consider the e¤ects of the policies
adopted within the various reform scenarios after 20 years10 . For each scenario and time, we perform
a stepwise linear regression and select the ve parameters/variables that explain most of the cross
country variations. In the sensitivity analysis plots presented hereafter, we show the scatterplots of
the GDP simulation results versus the ve most important parameters that a¤ect the scenario11 .
Moreover, we report:
1. the R2 of the multiple regression, which shows the portion of GDP variability explained by
the ve selected parameters;
2. the partial R2i of each of the ve selected parameters, which shows the portion of GDP
variability that is explained by univariate regressions, using each selected parameter singularly.
This indicates the sensitivityof the GDP results to each of the selected parameters.
3.1 Raising R&D through tax credits and wage subsidies
Government support to R&D activity is justied by the fact that social returns on R&D investment
are often higher than its private returns. R&D subsidies lower the cost of private R&D and therefore
promote investment in research projects. The role of scal incentives in raising R&D has been the
focus of a growing number of studies. Bloom et al. (2002) examine the e¤ect of tax credits on the
level of R&D investment for a panel of nine OECD countries, nding that a decrease of 10% in the
cost of R&D increases its level by approximately 1% in the short run and just under 10% in the
long run. Guellec and Potterie (2003) also analyse the impact of R&D funding in OECD countries
and conclude that the e¤ect of tax incentives is positive and most e¤ective when the policy is stable
over time.
10We will consider a 50 year horizon for the human capital scenarios where the timespan of the shocks are over 40
years.
11 In the scatterplots, the values of the parameters/variables are highlighted in red for the countries which joined
the EU from 2004 on and in blue for the old Member States.
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In what follows, two alternative policies are considered. In the rst scenario, the subsidy to
R&D consists of a permanent tax credit (A) of 0:1 percent of GDP granted to the non-liquidity
constrained households on their income from intangible capital (therefore APAt J
A;i
t =Y = 0:1).
Figure 10 shows the GDP e¤ect of the shock for each member state in terms of percentage deviation
from the baseline. The subsidy is nanced in a budgetary neutral manner through an increase in
lump-sum taxes paid by households. The simulations illustrate an important feature of semi-
endogenous growth models: in the long run, permanent subsidies to R&D-using sectors yield a
permanent increase in the level of GDP, while GDP growth stabilizes. Note that it takes time for
the output e¤ect to emerge because of short run output losses due to the reallocation of high skilled
workers from production to research.
An increase in tax credits allows households to lower the rental rate for intangibles, thereby
reducing the xed costs faced by intermediate goods producers. This translates into a rise in
the demand for patents, stimulates R&D and causes a reallocation of high skilled workers from
production into the research sector. The size of the e¤ect shows large variations across the member
states. After 20 years, the GDP increase relative to the baseline ranges from 0:05% (Sweden) to
1:92% (Cyprus). Because of supply constraints for high skilled workers, part of the scal stimulus
is o¤set by wage increases for high skilled workers.
The second policy considered is a permanent scal incentive of 0:1 percent of GDP consisting
of a subsidy (w) granted to the R&D sector on the wages of researchers (WwHLA=Y = 0:1).
Subsidies are again nanced through lump-sum taxes. The results (reported in Figure 12) show less
variation in the GDP e¤ects: 0:09 (Sweden) to 0:68 (Bulgaria) percent increase in GDP relative to
the baseline 20 years after the initial shock.
The multiple regressions (Figures 11 and 13) point to three major groups of factors behind the
cross-country di¤erences. An important explanatory factor lies behind the design of the shock,
which depends on the intensity of the R&D environment in the respective country. In particular,
we observe that countries with low R&D intensity (R&D investment as a percentage of GDP and
research labour, LA) gain the most from R&D promoting policies. This is partly due to the fact
that the 0:1% of GDP policy measure nalised to boost the knowledge sector represents a propor-
tionally stronger shock for countries investing less in R&D (notice that A = 0:1=(PAt J
A;i
t =Y ) and
W = 0:1=(w
H
LA=Y )
12) and is proportionally smaller for the R&D intensive countries (Sweden,
Finland, Denmark)13 .
Concerning the role of entry costs (FCA) and risk-premia (rpA), rst note that the countries
with low R&D intensity are typically characterized by higher entry-barriers to the R&D intensive
intermediate sector (high FCA and rpA) and, as we saw earlier, by construction of the shock, these
countries receive a stronger boost to their R&D sector. In addition, one can see from the arbitrage
equation (21a) that the cost of entering into the intermediate sector depends on iAt FCA and i
A
t P
A
t .
Increasing the tax subsidies and therefore reducing the rental rate of intangibles is magnied by the
size of administrative costs: the higher the costs, the higher the multiplier on A. In the case of the
wage subsidy, the e¤ects of declining patent prices are magnied by the risk-premia in the rental
rate of intangibles (which also appears among the factors explaining the cross-country di¤erences).
A second set of factors driving the results is given by the parameters governing knowledge
production and in particular by the elasticity of R&D production on the number of researchers,
; and the total factor e¢ ciency of R&D production, : The higher the values taken by these
parameter, the bigger the increase in the production of new designs in response to the tax credit.
The last explanatory factor is the percentage of GDP spent on government consumption (G=Y ).
The role of government consumption is not obvious, but can be probably best interpreted as an
indicator of the overall tax-burden in the country.
According to these model simulations, wage subsidies in the R&D sector are less e¢ cient than tax
12Where PAt J
A;i
t =Y is the R&D intensity and w
HLRD=Y is the labour cost of R&D production in terms of GDP.
13 In order to better explore the link between R&D intensity and the e¤ect of the subsidies on GDP, alternative
simulations have been ran where the increase in the tax credit or in the subsidy on researcherswages is identical for
all countries (0.1%). Even though cross-country variations are much smaller than in the case illustrated in Figure
1, R&D intensity still plays a role in explaining the impact of the tax incentive on GDP. In the case of the wage
subsidy, however, factors other than R&D intensity drive the e¤ects of the policy.
12
Figure 10: 0.1% of GDP tax credit (% deviation from baseline)
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credits for countries with relatively low R&D spending, while the opposite is true for countries with
higher R&D intensities. It can be shown that the presence of a positive mark-up in the intermediate
goods sector lowers the e¢ ciency of the tax credit, while R&D production is assumed to be perfectly
competitive. Notice that the R&D intensive countries have relatively higher intermediate mark-ups
which might explain the less e¢ cient tax credit shocks in their cases. As argued in the literature
(see Goolsbee (1998) and Wol¤ and Reinthaler (2008)), tax subsidies have signicant crowding
out e¤ects in the form of higher wages for high skilled workers as their labor supply is quite
inelastic. As a result, when the government funds R&D, a signicant fraction of the increased
spending goes directly into higher wages. Another explanation is that a smaller relative size of
research labour implies a higher rate of return from an increase of human resources devoted to R&D
(PATLRD =PAT = =LA), which also explains the stronger endogenous growth e¤ect for countries with
lower R&D labour intensity.
3.2 Reducing goods market mark-ups
Product market reforms in goods markets can be simulated as shocks that reduce the mark-up of
prices over marginal costs. In standard DSGE models, the link between the degree of competition
(as measured by the mark-up) and the level of economic activity is unambiguous. A mark-up
decrease always has a positive e¤ect on the demand for labour and on employment. Everaert
and Schule (2006), using the IMFs Global Economy Model and taking France and Belgium as case
studies, nd that lower mark-ups in the goods sector lead to an increase in GDP by 1:2 1:6%, while
reforms in the services sector have a stronger e¤ect (4:9  7:3%). The rise in GDP is accompanied
13
Figure 11: Regression analysis, tax credit
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Figure 12: 0.1% of GDP wage subsidy (% deviation from baseline)
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Figure 13: Regression analysis, wage subsidy
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by a more than proportional increase in the capital stock and a less than proportional positive
e¤ect on hours worked and consumption. These results are mainly driven by the initial size of the
mark-ups and the elasticity of output and employment to relative prices. Similar conclusions are
reached by Kilponen and Ripatti (2006) for the Finnish economy.
However, the relationship between mark-ups and output is more complex in an endogenous
growth model: in fact, the existence of a mark-up is required to cover the sunk costs associated with
the purchase of a patent by rms entering the intermediate goodsmarket. Due to the presence of
this additional transmission channel, a mark-up reduction in the intermediate goods sector operates
through two counteracting mechanisms. First, the decline in the price of goods stimulates demand
for the output of incumbent rms. On the other hand, the lower price reduces entry of new rms and
thereby the rate of technical progress. Thus, a mark-up reduction is expected to have a positive
impact on GDP in the nal goods sector (where the second channel does not operate) and an
ambiguous e¤ect in the intermediate goods sector.
3.2.1 Final goods sector
Figure 14 shows the GDP e¤ect of a 1% reduction of the price mark-up in the nal goods sector.
After 20 years, GDP increases by 0:56 (UK) to 1:11% (Latvia). This is partly ascribable to the
endogenous growth e¤ect generated by an increased demand for capital, which stimulates entry
of new rms and increases R&D production. The variation in the cross-country results is mostly
explained by the labour (capital) share of nal good production, by the aggregate and medium-
skilled workersemployment rates, L and LM , and by the government consumption share. A mark-
up reduction in the nal goods sector increases the demand for all factors of production (tangible
capital, K, intangible capital, A; and labour, L). Two factors are important for the output e¤ect:
the supply response of production factors and the response of output to a marginal change in the
factor that is changing. Concerning the rst e¤ect, note that L is inelastically supplied in the long
run, i. e. a reduction in mark-ups hardly changes the structural employment rate, but will mostly
increase the real wage. Therefore, labour market characteristics are not crucial. However, tangible
capital will adjust in the long run (because capital costs will not change and will be tied down by
15
Figure 14: 1pp level reduction of the nal goods market mark-up (% deviation from baseline)
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the world interest rate). Thus, the variables determining the rst order condition for capital are
crucial for the output e¤ect of a mark-up reduction. This can best be seen if the FOC is rewritten
in the following form:
Y =
K(r +  + rpK)
(1  )   FCY (rk)
This expression shows that the output e¤ect of a reduction in the mark up will positively covary
with the share of capital in production K MPK (where MPK is measured by the capital cost
term
 
r +  + rpK

) and the output elasticity of capital (1  ). Note that investment (I) appears
instead of K as an indicator because it depends positively on K and the depreciation rate . The
capital share is inversely related to the labour share, ; which explains the presence of L in the
regression results.
3.2.2 Intermediate goods sector
As shown in Figure 16, a mark-up reduction in the intermediate goods sector has signicantly
smaller GDP e¤ects (from  0:02% in Cyprus to 0:33% for Germany). This is due to the fact that
two o¤setting mechanisms are at work. The capital stock increases as a lower mark-up entails an
increase in the scale of output of incumbents. However, the mark-up reduction also deters entry
and therefore slows down technical progress. In some of the member states the two e¤ects balance
each other, so that the impact on GDP is close to zero. The smaller the negative entry-e¤ect, the
smaller the additional xed costs which are required to enter into the market. Therefore it is not
surprising that countries with a low rental rate of intangible capital, low initial entry costs (low iA
16
Figure 15: Regression analysis, nal goods mark-up
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and FCA) and high R&D intensity experience less of this negative e¤ect. Finally, a low elasticity
of R&D production and a high initial level of high skilled labour employed in the R&D sector are
associated with bigger GDP e¤ects, as they moderate the negative impact on R&D production of
the decrease in the demand for patents arising from reduced entry in the intermediate sector.
3.3 Reduction of capital costs
This section discusses the e¤ects of an exogenous reduction of capital costs, which can be thought of
as a decrease in the equity premium on physical and intangible capital (rpKt or rp
A
t ). These reduc-
tions are often associated with the stronger competitive pressures resulting from deeper nancial
market integration.
3.3.1 Final goods sector
Financial market integration is likely to reduce lending costs through an increase in risk sharing
opportunities and in banking competition. Hardouvelis et al. (2007) estimate that the increased
stock market integration resulting from the convergence process towards the EMU during the 1990s
has substantially reduced the cost of equity capital in the countries involved. The estimated fall in
the cost of equity ranges between 0:85 percentage points in the case of Spain and 1:96 percentage
points for France. A large literature also nds evidence of a strong positive relationship between
nancial development and output growth, see, among others, King and Levine (1993), Rajan and
Zingales (1998) and Levine and Zervos (1998). More recently, Guiso et al. (2004), using data on
EU countries, estimate a positive e¤ect of nancial development on growth and calculate that the
impact on manufacturing output growth of raising the level of nancial integration to US standards
would amount to 0:89 percentage points. The e¤ect is bigger the lower the degree of nancial
development and the higher the degree of specialisation of the country in nancially dependent
sectors.
In our simulations, a 0.5% reduction in capital costs increases GDP by between 1:14% (Lithua-
nia) and 2:13% (Greece) after 20 years (Figure 18). The output e¤ect is driven by an increase
in the demand for capital, which in turn stimulates market entry and innovation, and is therefore
17
Figure 16: 1pp level reduction of the intermediate goods market mark-up (% deviation from base-
line)
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Figure 17: Regression analysis, intermediate goods mark-up
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Figure 18: Reduction of tangible capital costs, nal goods sector (% deviation from baseline)
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higher than the impact the same shock would have in a standard growth model. Figure 19 shows
that the cross-country impact of a reduction in capital costs depends positively on the stock of
capital in the economy (K) and negatively on the initial level of the rental rate of tangible capital
(ik). The output e¤ect is also larger the higher the aggregate wage level (as expressed by the CES
aggregate of wages in the nal goods sector, WCES). As the wage level depends on the e¢ ciency of
the di¤erent skill groups, it can be taken as an indicator of the e¢ ciency of labour in the country
of interest and is therefore associated with a bigger increase in production following a same size
decrease in capital costs. The rst order condition for capital (equation rk, section 4.2.1) helps ex-
plaining the role of xed costs (FCY ). Countries with large xed costs in production tend to show
a larger (%) output expansion with a reduction in capital cost. This is not a sign that countries
with high xed costs respond more exibly to changes in capital cost but it rather reects a base
e¤ect. Everything else equal, countries with higher xed costs will have a lower level of output for
the same capital input. Since xed costs do not a¤ect the rst order condition for capital, both
countries expand their capital stock equally in percentage terms. However, since the country with
higher xed costs produces less nal output, the same percentage change in capital leads to a larger
percentage increase in output. Finally, the role of transfers can be explained by a wealth e¤ect.
In fact, the bigger the transfer component of householdsincome the smaller the response of real
wages to changes in the level of economic activity and the bigger the increase in employment and
output.
19
Figure 19: Regression analysis, tangible capital costs
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3.3.2 Intermediate goods sector
Investing in ideas is more risky compared to physical capital investment because in the case of failure
of the project the initial investment (patent) may have to be written o¤ completely, while physical
investment goods still have a sizeable resale value in case of bankruptcy. Because intangibles do
not constitute collateral to the same extent as tangible capital, nancing constraints are likely to
be more acute. And although both existing rms and start-up companies face similar problems
when marketing new products, in the case of start-ups these problems are likely to be more severe.
Start-ups do not have access to public capital markets and in the absence of a track record they
may have more di¢ culties to obtain bank nance. New rms also have to overcome administrative
obstacles when setting up a new company (although existing companies may face administrative
costs when introducing new products as well). As pointed out in a study by Aghion et al. (2007),
nancial constraints related to entry could be as important as labour market rigidities in terms of
obstacles to growth. When it comes to innovation, there are numerous examples which indicate
that a larger share of innovations is undertaken by young rms in the US compared to the EU.
A particular form of nancing innovations, namely venture capital has become a popular form
of nancing young rms in high-tech sectors in the US and since the beginning of the 1990s it has
also become popular in the EU. It now amounts to 0:12% of GDP compared to 0:19% in the US14 .
There are numerous studies both at the micro and the macro level suggesting a positive relationship
between the availability of venture capital and economic performance.15 Venture capitalists provide
loans to start-ups and they require a return to compensate for the opportunity cost of not investing
in alternative assets as well as for the risk associated with such an investment. With underdevel-
oped venture capital markets investors lack opportunities to diversify risk and therefore require a
larger risk premium. Philippon and Véron (2007) suggest a number of measures to increase the
supply of venture capital nancing. Among others they argue for more competition in the banking
14These gures are calculated as an average over the period 2004-2006 (source: Meyer (2008)). Notice however,
some countries in the EU, notably those with a high-tech specialisation such as the UK, Sweden and Denmark have a
share of venture capital investment that exceeds that of the US. However high tech states in the US such as California
have VC investment shares far larger than EU regions.
15At the micro level Hellmann and Puri (2000) and at the macro level Romain and Pottelsberghe (2004) establish
a positive relationship between venture capital and (productivity) growth.
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Figure 20: Reduction of intangible capital costs, intermediate goods sector (% deviation from
baseline)
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
Years
Source: QUEST III simulations
OS
BE
BG
CY
CZ
DK
EE
SF
FR
DE
GR
HU
IR
IT
LV
LT
MT
NL
PL
PO
RO
SK
SI
ES
SW
UK
sector, changes in insolvency legislation and removal of prudential regulations, which hamper equity
investment by institutional investors such as pension funds and insurance companies.
Figure 20 shows the GDP e¤ects of a 0.5% reduction in nancing costs for start-ups. Improving
access to credit for start-ups makes projects which generate a lower present discounted value of
prots protable and thereby stimulates entry and the introduction of new products. In the long
run the level of output could increase by about 0:06 (UK) to 0:26% (Hungary) and investment would
be directed more towards R&D with this more targeted measure. The cross-country variations are
largely explained by the entry costs, FCA, and the R&D share. Note that xed costs for intangibles
and the R&D share are closely negatively correlated. This suggests the following interpretation:
the presence of high entry barriers for intangibles reduces the level of intangible capital (R&D) and
keeps up the marginal product of intangible capital. The same absolute reduction in capital costs
will therefore yield higher output e¤ects in countries with a high marginal product of intangible
capital. The multiple regressions also show that in countries with a higher elasticity of R&D
with respect to research labour, , and higher R&D e¢ ciency, , the knowledge sector and thus
production receive a stronger boost from the reduction in intangible capital costs.
3.4 Reducing xed costs
Financing costs faced by start-ups and the absence of venture capital, whose role was discussed in
the previous section, represent indirect examples of entry barriers. This section examines a more
direct example of entry barriers removal in the form of a reduction in administrative entry barriers
21
Figure 21: Regression analysis, intangible capital costs
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or xed costs.
3.4.1 Reduction in entry costs in intermediate goods sector
Recent empirical studies link cross-country di¤erences in growth performance to their degree of
market regulation. Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) nd a negative relationship between multi-factor
productivity and economy-wide and sector-specic entry barriers, while Alesina et al. (2005) focus
on the impact of regulations, and in particular entry barriers, on investment, providing evidence of
a negative relationship between the two. Both studies also conclude that the biggest impact of the
reforms occurs in potentially competitive markets. Buttner (2006) nds that reducing entry fees
increases the steady state rate of innovation and therefore growth.
Figure 22 shows the GDP e¤ects of a 10% reduction in xed costs in the intermediate sector,
FCA (entry costs faced by intermediate rms). In the EU, administrative costs for starting a
new company are much larger than in the US. However, one has to be careful when making a
comparison as one important argument for a downward bias of the US level of entry regulation
is the high standard of consumer protection legislation in the US. In the case of non-compliance,
rms operating in the US are facing costly litigation procedures and high nes. Entry regulation
in Europe can be seen as forcing rms to comply with certain health and safety standards. But
given the wide variation of start-up costs in the EU it seems feasible to lower administrative entry
costs towards levels prevailing in best practice countries. Here we look at the e¤ects of reducing
administrative entry barriers by 10%.
Qualitatively, the e¤ects on the composition of investment (tangible vs. intangible) are similar
to the experiment of reducing nancing costs, since administrative entry barriers act like a sunk cost
for potential entrants in the same way as nancing costs do. However, initial nancing costs exceed
start-up costs signicantly. Therefore also a full elimination of start-up costs would not dramatically
increase GDP. Decreasing entry costs lowers the prots requirement for intermediate producers and
thereby increases entry of new rms. The higher demand for patents increases the demand for high
skilled workers and leads to some reallocation of high skilled workers from production to the R&D
sector and an increase in their wage. The output gain ranges from close to zero (Sweden, 0:01%)
to 0:64% (Greece). The cross-country di¤erences are explained by the same factors as in the case
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Figure 22: 10% reduction in intermediate rmsentry barriers (% deviation from baseline)
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Years
Source: QUEST III simulations
OS
BE
BG
CY
CZ
DK
EE
SF
FR
DE
GR
HU
IR
IT
LV
LT
MT
NL
PL
PO
RO
SK
SI
ES
SW
UK
of other R&D promoting policies. There is a base-e¤ect from the initial size of entry costs and the
GDP e¤ect is bigger in countries with low R&D intensity and research labour share. Moreover,
bigger output e¤ects are experienced by countries with a high elasticity of R&D with respect to
research labour, ; and higher R&D e¢ ciency, .
3.4.2 Reduction in administrative burden
A reduction in the administrative burden is another example of a policy decreasing the xed costs
faced by rms. The EU has proposed to reduce this burden through a reduction of EU related
regulation (which is estimated to constitute 35% of the total burden) by 25%. In our simula-
tions, consistent with the xed cost nature of administrative costs, the reform is implemented as a
reduction in overhead labour (FCL).
A reduction in administrative costs is benecial for rms since it reduces average production
costs, i.e. less overhead labour is required for producing the same level of output. However, unlike
an increase in labour augmenting technical progress, a reduction of xed costs does not increase the
marginal product of labour and thereby leads to a downward shift in labour demand. It increases
protability of rms and therefore increases investment, however the increase in investment is
typically not strong enough to prevent employment from falling below the baseline level. In this
scenario, the overall macroeconomic impact of the reform does hardly exceed the direct cost-reducing
e¤ect. The output gain ranges from 0:38% (Slovakia) to 0:61% (Portugal). The negative impact of
openness (1  sM ) on the GDP e¤ect is related to the stronger negative terms of trade e¤ect under
higher degrees of openness. The real depreciation increases the price of capital via an increase in
the price of imported investment goods and the decline in labour input in the nal goods sector
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Figure 23: Regression analysis, intermediate rmsentry barriers
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lowers the marginal product of capital which further reduces the demand for physical capital. The
second group of explanatory factors is related to the share of wage costs via the employment rates
and wages. Under higher employment rates for low-skilled workers (which are associated with a
low preference parameter for leisure, !L) the reduction of overhead labour has a stronger GDP
e¤ect.16 Consumption by liquidity constrained households, who provide exclusively low skilled
labour services, also appears among the explanatory factors as it depends on the corresponding
employment rate. Finally, higher wages for high-skilled workers (who partially reallocate from the
nal goods to the research sector as a result of the reduction in overhead labour) are associated
with a bigger increase in output.
3.5 Exogenous productivity improvements
In this section, we consider the e¤ects of an exogenous productivity improvement shock, which is
simulated as a 1% increase of Aexogt in the production function of nal output (equation 13). An
increase in the level of labour e¢ ciency has a permanent positive impact on output, consumption
and capital. The model engenders a larger GDP e¤ect than a standard neoclassical growth model
as it generates an endogenous R&D response to the TFP shock in the nal goods sector. The
increased demand for investment goods stimulates entry into the intermediate goods production
sector, thereby increasing the e¢ ciency of capital. The TFP shock also a¤ects the skill premium
positively. This is because the technology shock leads to an increase in the demand for R&D, which
in turn raises the demand for high skilled workers more than proportionally.
The output gain ranges from 0:60% (Slovakia) to 0:91% (UK). As in the case of a reduction in the
administrative burden, the negative relationship between the degree of openness and the GDP e¤ect
is explained by the stronger negative terms of trade e¤ect experienced by more open economies.
Moreover, labour augmenting technical progress has a stronger impact on output in countries with
higher employment rates. Finally, a high level of consumption by liquidity constrained households
and a low preference parameter for leisure are among the factors explaining the cross-country
variations, as they are linked to high employment rates for low-skilled workers.
16Note that the e¤ective labour input of nal good rms is L(1  fcl), where fcl is the overhead labour-share.
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Figure 24: 10% reduction in nal good rmsadministrative burdens (% deviation from baseline)
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Figure 25: Regression analysis, nal good rmsadministrative burdens
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Figure 26: 1% permanent level increase of labour productivity (% deviation from baseline)
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Figure 27: Regression analysis, labour productivity
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3.6 Reducing wage mark-ups
In the monopolistically competitive labour market of our model, households act as wage setters
and can charge a wage mark-up 1=Wt over the reservation wage (given by the ratio of the mar-
ginal disutility of labour to the marginal utility of consumption). The mark-up depends on the
intratemporal elasticity of substitution between the di¤erentiated labour services supplied and a
lower mark-up implies a reduction in the monopolistic power of workers (or trade unions) and an
increase in substitutability among di¤erent labour services. Institutional reforms in the labour mar-
ket that reduce this mark-up will unambiguously raise the employment rate. Everaert and Schule
(2006) analyse the transition dynamics and the long-run e¤ects of a reduction in wage mark-ups
in the Euro Area. They nd that labour market reforms lead to a gradual increase in output and
employment, while consumption remains at its baseline for about eight quarters and real wages
decline. In the long run, hours worked increase more than proportionally and investment less than
proportionally than output and consumption. This leads the authors to argue that reforms in the
product and labour markets should be synchronised in order to mitigate the transition costs and
achieve a faster adjustment.
In the simulation reported in Figure 28 the mark-up shock is calibrated as a 1% increase in
the elasticity between di¤erent labour services. A lower mark-up yields a reduction in wages and
gradually raises employment. Although the proportional change in the mark-up is the same for
all three skill groups, the employment rate on the baseline is highest for the high-skilled group
and lowest for low-skilled. Therefore, the same increase in employment is a proportionally larger
reduction in leisure for the high-skilled and this puts upward pressure on their wages. As a result,
the low-skilled face the strongest decrease in wages, the high-skilled the smallest decline, and the
increase in the employment rate is largest for the low-skilled and smallest for the high-skilled.
Output increases following the boost to employment, but the increase in GDP is initially less
than proportional because of a negative productivity trade-o¤. However, in the long run, the
GDP e¤ect becomes larger due to an endogenous R&D response. A higher employment rate of
high-skilled in the R&D sector as well as increased demand for new patents from entry of new
rms in the intermediate sector boost output of the R&D sector and raise total productivity. The
output gain ranges from 0:19% (Sweden) to 0:46% (Poland). There is a tendency for countries with
low employment rates to experience a larger output (labour supply) e¤ect from an increase in the
demand for labour. This is because leisure is a normal good and has an upper limit (formally the
marginal utility of leisure is given by !(1  L) ).
3.7 Tax shift from labour tax to consumption tax
Shifting the burden of taxation from direct taxes towards indirect taxes may yield positive labour
market e¤ects. Labour supply (and therefore wages) depends on the total tax burden of a worker
household, but by shifting the tax burden from wage income to other sources of income, like transfer
income, prot and interest income, total distortions on employment decisions can be reduced and
one could expect favourable labour supply e¤ects from such a tax shift.
The e¤ects of a switch from labour to consumption taxation will depend on how other income
groups are compensated for the tax increase. The simulation shown in Figure 30 shows the e¤ects of
the reduction in labour taxes twt and an increase in consumption taxes t
C
t of 1 percent of (baseline)
GDP under the assumption of benet and transfer indexation to consumer prices. The reduction
in labour tax leads to an increase in employment and in output.
Layard et al. (1991) have raised doubts about the potential gains from a shift in taxation towards
indirect taxes based on the empirical observation that real wages will only fall temporarily after
such a tax shock. Interestingly real wage costs only fall temporarily in these simulations as well.
Nevertheless there is a real positive employment and GDP e¤ect. This can be explained when we
take into account various dynamic adjustment mechanisms. The basic intuition behind this result
is the fact that a temporary increase in employment leads to an increase in the capital stock in the
medium term until the pre-existing capital/labour ratio is re-established. However once the initial
capital-labour ratio is re-established the marginal product of labour returns to its initial level and
therefore the real wages that rms are willing to pay return to the baseline level at a higher level of
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Figure 28: Wage mark-up reduction (% deviation from baseline)
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Figure 29: Regression analysis, wage mark-up
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employment and capital. For a more detailed discussion of the short and long term e¤ects of such
a tax shift see European Commission (2008), part IV.
Note again that the long run output e¤ect of this tax shift is proportionally larger than the
increase in employment and capital accumulation due to an endogenous R&D increase. Employment
in the R&D sector is higher and the increase in output ("ideas/patents") leads to an increase in
total productivity. The output gain is the lowest for Romania (0:07%) and the highest for France
(1:14%).
The source of the positive employment (and GDP) e¤ect is due to the shift in taxation from
wages to income from nancial wealth. To understand the labour supply e¤ect of the tax shift
consider the following simplied labour supply equation:
L = 1  !
 
PCC
W 1 tw
1+tC
!
where  denotes the elasticity of labour supply, L, ! is the preference parameter for leisure and the
tax wedge is given by
twedge =
1  tw
1 + tC
The % change of the tax wedge (w. r. t. a constant absolute change in the labour tax rate)
increases with the initial level of the tax rate:
@twedge
@tw
1
twedge
=
1
1  tw
This explains why in countries with an initially high tax rate the % increase in net income of
such a tax shift is a positive function of the initial level of the labour tax. Note that there is also a
negative relationship between the level of labour taxation and the employment rate. Nevertheless,
the level of the employment rate has an independent e¤ect, because (see the discussion in the
section on the wage mark up) the labour supply elasticity is inversely related to the employment
rate (see Figure 31 ). Finally, countries with a high level of transfers (normally associated with
higher government debt, B) experience a stronger output e¤ect due to the wealth e¤ect discussed
in section 4.3.1.
3.8 Shift in labour tax from low skilled to high skilled workers
We also simulate a shift in the burden of taxation from low-skilled workers to high-skilled workers.
As the average employment rate for low-skilled workers in the EU is much lower than that for
medium- and high-skilled workers, many member states have focussed their reforms towards policies
that aim to raise the employment rate of this group by reducing their tax burden. For instance, in
the period 2000 to 2006, the total tax wedge for low-skilled workers has been reduced by almost 4
percent17 .
Figure 32 shows the macroeconomic impact of a 0:1 per cent of GDP shift from low-skilled to
high-skilled workers in the Member States. Lower taxes for low skilled workers increase employment
for that skill group, higher taxes for high skilled reduce their employment rate. There is a negative
endogenous TFP e¤ect as employment in the R&D sector declines, and this reduces the GDP impact
in the long run. GDP is 0:02 (Cyprus) to 0:24% (Poland) higher after 20 years. For similar reasons
as explained in the earlier tax-shift scenario, the baseline levels of labour taxes and employment
rates play an important role here. Higher taxes and lower employment levels result in a stronger
employment response. Note that lower employment in the baseline means that the changes in taxes
should also be higher to achieve the 0:1% of GDP tax-shift.
17Based on the change in the total tax wedge (including social security contributions by employees and employers)
for representative groups of earners (percentage relative to average wage) over the period 2000 to 2006.
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Figure 30: 1% of GDP tax shift from labour to consumption taxes (% deviation from baseline)
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Figure 31: Regression analysis, labour to consumption tax
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Figure 32: 0.1% tax shift from low to high-skilled labour
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Figure 33: Regression analysis, tax shift from low to high skilled
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3.9 Reducing unemployment benet generosity
In the model, households set wages by maximising a weighted average of their utility functions
and the wage rule is obtained by equating the ratio between the weighted average of the marginal
utility of leisure and the weighted average of the marginal utility of consumption, and the di¤erence
between the real wage and unemployment benets, adjusted for a mark-up. Unemployment benets
act in the model like a subsidy to leisure. A reduction in the benet replacement rate is like a
reduction in the reservation wage as it puts downward pressure on wages and so boosts labour
demand.
The e¤ects of a 5% reduction in bst for all three skill groups are shown in Figure 34. The
impact on output and employment is similar to that of a reduction in the wage mark-up. As the
employment rate on the baseline is lowest for the low-skilled group, the same increase in employment
is a proportionally smaller reduction in leisure for this group and this puts less upward pressure
on their wages. As a result, the decline in wages for low-skilled is larger than that for other skill
groups, and the increase in their employment is also larger.
The dynamic adjustment of real wages, employment and productivity is similar to the previous
case of a reduction in the wage mark-up. The benet reduction acts like a negative shock to
wages, which increases the demand for labour and initially reduces labour productivity. Wages and
productivity increase over time and return to their baseline values as investment picks up. Unlike
in a model with exogenous technical progress there is a small positive long term productivity e¤ect
due to a higher employment rate of high-skilled workers in the R&D sector as well as an increased
demand for new patents from entry of new rms in the intermediate sector. GDP is 0:59 (Estonia)
to 4:36% (France) higher after 20 years. The cross-country di¤erences are again largely due to the
baseline e¤ect of taxes and the corresponding employment rates. Extending our earlier analysis
with the benet replacement rate, the inverse labour supply is given as
W
P
=
1 + tC
1  tL   b!
1= C
(1  L)1=
:
One can see that under higher labour taxes, there is a stronger multiplier with respect to the
changes in the benet replacement rate. The role of transfers and government debt is again due to
the wealth e¤ect.
3.10 Improving human capital
Europe employs a relatively large share of low skilled workers compared to the US (35% vs. 12%),
while the US share of medium skilled is substantially higher than in the EU (80% vs. 58%). Figure
36 shows the simulation results for an increase in the EU medium-skilled labour share. The shock
is designed to linearly increase the share of medium-skilled workers by 1 percentage point in 40
years and decrease the low-skilled share accordingly. The output e¤ect gradually builds up as the
share of medium-skilled workers increases relative to the low-skilled share, with a positive impact
of 0:27 (Ireland) to 0:90 (Portugal) per cent after 50 years. The additional medium-skilled labour
will be employed at higher e¢ ciency than the replaced low-skilled workers in the production of
nal goods, with the skill-premium decreasing relative to the other skill-groups (low- and high-
skilled). Implied by imperfect substitutability between di¤erent types of workers, an increase in the
share of medium-skilled workers has positive wage e¤ects for low-skilled workers. The cross-country
di¤erences are driven by the real wages and the e¢ ciency level of medium-skilled (wM , efM ), by the
high-skilled and medium-skilled labour in nal goods production (LHY and LMY ) and by the level
of e¢ ciency of R&D production, . The higher the relative e¢ ciency of medium-skilled, the higher
their marginal productivity and the output gain from a marginal increase in their employment. The
role of the e¢ ciency of R&D production, on the other hand, can be explained by the fact that the
shock generates a reallocation of high-skilled labour from nal goods production to the research
sector. The higher , the bigger the increase in the production of new designs following an increase
in high-skilled labour employed in the R&D sector. Finally, countries with lower employment rates
experience a more sizeable output e¤ect.
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Figure 34: 5pp reduction in the benet replacement rate (% deviation from baseline)
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Figure 35: Regression analysis, benet replacement rate reduction
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Figure 36: 1pp increase of the share of medium skilled (% deviation from baseline)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Source: QUEST III simulations
Years
OS
BE
BG
CY
CZ
DK
EE
SF
FR
DE
GR
HU
IR
IT
LV
LT
MT
NL
PL
PO
RO
SK
SI
ES
SW
UK
The share of high skilled labour in the EU is 1:4% lower than in the US (6:2% vs. 7:6%).
Figure 38 shows the e¤ects of increasing the EU high-skilled labour share by 1 percentage point
and decreasing the medium-skilled share accordingly. The largest fraction of the additional high
skilled labour will be employed in the production of nal goods (replacing the less e¢ cient medium
skilled workers). However, after around ve years there is an increase in employment in the R&D
sector because of a decline in the wage of high skilled workers. This reduces the price of patents and
stimulates entry in the intermediate goods sector. Output is gradually building up with a positive
impact of 0:35 (Slovakia) to 0:82 (Italy) per cent in the long run. The cross country di¤erences
are explained by the degree of openness of the economy, (1   sM ), because of the negative terms
of trade e¤ect, and by the wage paid to high skilled workers (wH). The higher the wage and the
corresponding relative marginal productivity of the high skilled, the higher the output gain from
a marginal increase in their employment. A further explanatory factor is the low-skilled workers
preference parameter on leisure, !L. Its role can be explained by the stronger uctuations in
employment in response to wage changes in the presence of high values of ! (which is generally
higher for low-skilled workers than for the other skill groups). Finally, high taxation on consumption,
tC , is associated with smaller GDP e¤ects.
Conclusions
In this paper we described a calibrated micro-founded dynamic general equilibrium model with
endogenous growth for all EU member states that can be used to analyse the macroeconomic
impact of structural reforms in Europe. The new QUEST III model allows us to explicitly model the
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Figure 37: Regression analysis, medium skilled
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Figure 38: 1pp increase of the share of high skilled (% deviation from baseline)
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Figure 39: Regression analysis, high skilled
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reforms in terms of concrete and quantiable policy measures, in particular scal policy instruments
such as taxes, benets, subsidies and education expenditures, administrative costs faced by rms
and regulatory indices. This makes the model a useful tool for analysing the costs and benets
of structural reforms at member state level. Our results conrm Roeger et al. (2008) on the
benecial e¤ects on output and employment of skill-biased tax reforms, measures that improve the
skill composition of the labour force, R&D subsidies, raising competition in nal goods market,
increased nancial market integration and measures that remove entry barriers in certain markets.
The e¤ects of structural reforms show large variations across the member states. We employ
multiple-regression analysis to explore the most important factors driving the di¤erences between
our country-specic simulation results. We nd that less R&D intensive countries would benet the
most from R&D promoting and skill-upgrading policies. We also nd that shifting from labour to
consumption taxes, reducing the benet replacement rate and easing administrative entry barriers
are most e¤ective in countries where initial labour taxes and entry barriers are high.
One can think of many directions in which this model can be extended. A further disaggregation
of taxes would be desirable to fully capture the di¤erential impacts individual taxes can have on
the economy. Further work is also needed to endogenise the skill premium, and to endogenise the
risk-premia via the introduction of a banking sector.
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Appendix A: The model
Households
The household sector consists of a continuum of households h 2 [0; 1]. A share (1   ) of these
households are not liquidity constrained (Ricardian) i 2 [0; 1  "] and they have access to nancial
markets where they can purchase and sell domestic and foreign assets. These households accumu-
late physical capital which they rent out to the intermediate sector, and they also buy the patents
of designs produced by the R&D sector and license them to the intermediate goods producing
rms. Non-liquidity constrained household members o¤er medium- and high-skilled labour services
indexed by s 2 fM;Hg. The remaining share  of households is liquidity constrained and indexed
by k 2 [1  "; 1]. These households cannot trade in any type of assets but consume their dispos-
able income each period. We assume that liquidity constrained households o¤er low-skilled labour
services only. In each skill group households supply di¤erentiated labour services to unions which
act as wage setters in monopolistically competitive labour markets. The unions pool wage income
and distribute it in equal proportions among their members. Nominal rigidity in wage setting is
introduced by assuming that households face adjustment costs for changing wages.
Non liquidity constrained households
Non liquidity constrained households maximise an intertemporal utility function in consumption
and leisure subject to a budget constraint. They make decisions about consumption (Cit), labour
supply (Lit), investments into domestic and foreign nancial assets (B
i
t and B
F;i
t ), the purchases of
investment good (J it ), the renting of physical capital stock (K
i
t), the degree of capacity utilisation
(ucapit), the purchases of new patents from the R&D sector (J
A;i
t ), and the licensing of existing
patents (Ait). On the revenue side, households receive wage income (W
i
t ), unemployment benets
(bstW
i;s
t )
18 , transfer income from the government (TRit) and interest income (it; i
K
t and i
A
t ). The
Lagrangian of this maximisation problem is given by
Max8>><>>:
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(1)
The budget constraints are written in real terms normalized with Pt, the price of domestic nal
goods. All rms are owned by the Ricardian households who share the total prot of the nal
and intermediate sector rms,
Pn
j=1 PR
f;i
j;tand
PAt
j=1 PR
x;i
j;t , where n and At denote the number of
rms in the nal and intermediate sector respectively. All households pay twt wage income taxes
and tKt capital income taxes less tax credits (
K and A) and depreciation allowances (tKt K and
tKt A) after their earnings on physical capital and patents. There is no perfect arbitrage between
di¤erent types of assets, households face a nancial intermediation premium  BF (:) which depends
on the economy-wide net holdings of internationally traded bonds. When investing into tangible
and intangible capital households require premia rpKt and rp
A
t in order to cover the increased risk
18Notice, households only make a decision about the level of employment but there is no distinction on the part
of households between unemployment and non participation. See Roeger et al. (2008).
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on the return related to these assets. The real interest rate rt is equal to the nominal interest rate
minus expected ination: rt = it   Et(t+1).
We assume additively separable utility function in consumption (Cit) and leisure (1 Li;st ). We
assume log-utility for consumption and allow for habit persistence.
U(Cit) = (1  habc) log
 
Cit   habcCt 1

(2a)
For leisure we assume CES preferences with common labour supply elasticity but a skill specic
weight (!s) on leisure which is necessary in order to capture di¤erences in employment levels across
skill groups:
V (1  Li;st ) =
!s
1   (1  L
i;s
t )
1 ; with  > 0: (2b)
The investment decisions w.r.t. real capital and decisions w.r.t. the degree of capacity utilisation
are subject to convex adjustment costs  J and  U , which are given by
 J(J
i
t ) =
K
2
 
J it
2
Kit 1
+
I
2
(J it )
2 (3a)
and
 U (ucap
i
t) = a1
 
ucapit   ucapsst

+ a2
 
ucapit   ucapsst
2
; (4a)
where ucapsst is the steady state capacity utilisation.
Wages are also subject to convex adjustment costs given by
 W (W
i;s
t ) =
X
s
WL
i;s
t
2

W i;st
2
W i;st 1
(5)
We denote with PC the corresponding utility based deator for the C and J aggregate. The rst
order conditions of the household with respect to consumption, nancial and real assets are given
by
@V0
@Cit
=> U iC;t   it(1 + tct)PCt = 0; (6a)
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(6e)
@V0
@ucapit
=> iKt   a1   2a2
 
ucapit   ucapsst

= 0: (6f)
From the above arbitrage conditions after neglecting the second order terms, investment is given
as a function of the variable Qt
Qt   1 = K

J it
Kit 1

+ IJ
i
t   K   Et

IJ
i
t+1
1 + it   Ct+1

with Qt =
t
PCt
; (7a)
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where Qt is the present discounted value of the rental rate of return from investing in real assets
Qt = Et
 
1  
1 + it   Ct+1
Qt+1 +
(1  tKt )
 
iKt ucap
i
t   rpKt    u
 
ucapit

+ tKt 
K
1 + it   Ct+1
!
(7b)
Notice that the relevant discount factor for the investor is the nominal interest rate adjusted by the
trading friction minus the expected ination of investment goods (Ct+1).
Ricardian households purchase new patents of designs produced by the R&D sector (IAt ) and
rent their total stock of design (At) at rental rate iAt to intermediate goods producers in period
t. Households pay income tax at rate tKt on the period return of intangibles and they receive tax
subsidies at rate A. The rst order conditions with respect to R&D investments are given by
@V0
@Ait
=>  it it + Et
 
it+1 
i
t+1(1  A)
+it+1

(1  tKt )(iAt   rpAt ) + tKt A

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!
= 0 (7c)
@V0
@JA;it
=>  itPAt
 
1  A+ it it = 0 (7d)
where the rental rate can be obtained from 6b, 7c and 7d after neglecting the second order
terms:
iAt 
(1  A)

it   At+1 + A

  tKt A
(1  tKt )
+ rpAt (8)
where 1 + At+1 =
PAt+1
PAt
.
Equation (8) shows that households require a rate of return on intangible capital equal to the
nominal interest rate minus the rate of change of the value of intangible assets and has to cover the
cost of economic depreciation plus a risk premium. Governments can a¤ect investment decisions in
intangible capital by giving tax incentives in the form of tax credits and depreciation allowances or
by lowering the tax on the return from patents.
Liquidity constrained households
Liquidity constrained households do not optimize but simply consume their current income in each
period. Real consumption of liquidity household are determined by the net wage income plus net
transfers
(1 + tct)P
C
t C
k
t +
X
s
WL
k;s
t
2

W k;st
2
W k;st 1
=
X
s

(1  tw;st ) W k;st Lk;st
+bstW
k;s
t (1 NPART k;st   Lk;st )

+ TRkt : (9)
Wage setting
In each skill group a variety of labour services are supplied which are imperfect substitutes to each
other. Therefore trade unions can charge a wage mark-up (1=Wt ) over the reservation wage. The
reservation wage is the ratio of the marginal utility of leisure to the corresponding marginal utility of
consumption. The relevant net real wage is the gross wage adjusted for labour taxes, consumption
taxes and unemployment benets:
Uh;s1 L;t
UhC;t
1
Wt
=
W st (1  tw;st   bst )
(1 + tCt )P
C
t
for h 2 fi; kg and s 2 fL;M;Hg:
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Aggregation
The aggregate of any household specic variable Xht in per capita terms is given by
Xt =
Z 1
0
Xht dh = (1  ")Xit + "Xkt ; (10)
and the aggregate consumption and employment is given by
Ct = (1  ")Cit + "Ckt (11)
and
Lt = (1  ")Lit + "Lkt : (12)
Firms
Final output producers
Each rm j (j = 1; ::::; n) produces a variety of the domestic good which is an imperfect substitute
for the varieties produced by other rms and acts as a monopolistic competitor facing a demand
function with a price elasticity of d. Final output (Y j) is produced using A varieties of intermediate
inputs (x) with an elasticity of substitution . The nal good sector uses a labour aggregate
and domestic intermediate goods with Cobb-Douglas technology, subject to a xed cost FCY and
overhead labour FCL
Y j =

Aexogt

LjY; t   FCL
 AtX
i=1

xji;t
! 1 
KGGt   FCY ; 0 <  < 1 (13)
with
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 
efML
M
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L 1
L + s
1
L
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 
efHL
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t
L 1
L
! L
L 1
; (14)
where ss is the population share of labour-force in subgroup s (low-, medium- and high-skilled),
Ls denotes the employment rate of population s, efs is the corresponding e¢ ciency unit, L is the
elasticity of substitution between di¤erent labour types and KG denotes the stock of public capital
with an elasticity of G. High-skilled labour in the nal goods sector, LHYt , is the total high-skill
employment minus the high-skilled labour working for the R&D sector (LA;t). The employment
aggregates Lst combine varieties of di¤erentiated labour services supplied by individual household
Lst =
Z 1
0

Ls;ht
s 1
s
dh
 s
s 1
; (15)
where s > 1 determines the degree of substitutability among di¤erent types of labour.
The objective of the rm is to maximise prots in terms of
PRf;jt = P
j
t Y
j
t  

WLt L
j;L
t +W
M
t L
j;M
t +W
H
t L
j;HY
t

 
AtX
i=1

px i;t x
j
i;t

; (16)
where px is the price of intermediate inputs and W st is a wage index corresponding to the CES
aggregate Lj;st . All prices and wages are normalized with the price of domestic nal goods, Pt. In
a symmetric equilibrium, the demand for labour and intermediate inputs is given by

Yt + FCY
LY; t   FCL

LY; t
Lst
 1
L
s
1
L
s ef
L 1
L
s t =W
s
t ; s 2 fL; M; Hg (17a)
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pxi;t = t(1  ) (Yt + FCY )
 
AtX
i=1

xji;t
! 1  
x i;t
 1
(17b)
where, following the literature, we dene the inverse mark up factor as a function of the elas-
ticity of substitution and changes in forward and backward looking ination t = 1   1=dt  
p=
d
t ( (sfpEtt+1 + (1  sfp)t 1)  t) .
Intermediate goods producers
In the intermediate sector monopolistically competitive rms have entered the market by renting a
design from domestic households and by making an initial payment FCA to overcome administrative
entry barriers. Capital inputs are also rented from the household sector for a rental rate of iKt . Firms
which have rented a design can transform each unit of capital into a single unit of an intermediate
input (Jones 2005 and 1995). Intermediate goods producing rms sell their products to domestic
nal good producers only, therefore the inverse demand function of domestic nal good producers
is given as in equation (17b).
Each domestic intermediate rm faces the following prot-maximisation problem
PRxi;t = max
xi;t

pxi;txi;t   iKt PCt ki;t   iAPAt   FCA
	
(18)
subject to the linear technology which allows to transform one unit of e¤ective capital (ki;tucapt)
into one unit of an intermediate good
xi;t = ki;t  ucapt: (19)
In a symmetric equilibrium the rst order condition is
t(1  ) (Yt + FCY )
 
AtX
i=1

xji;t
! 1
(xt)
 1
= iKt P
C
t (20a)
Intermediate goods producers set prices as a mark up over marginal cost. Therefore prices for the
domestic market are given by:
PXt = pxi;t =
iKt P
C
t

: (20b)
The no-arbitrage condition requires that entry into the intermediate goods producing sector takes
place until
PRxi;t = PR
x
t = i
A
t P
A
t +
 
iAt + 
A
t+1

FCA; 8i (21a)
or equivalently, the present discounted value of prots is equated to the xed entry costs plus the
net value of patents
PAt + FCA =
1X
j=1
 
1
1 + rt+j + rpAt+j
!j
PRxt+j 1 (21b)
For an intermediate producer, entry costs consist of the licensing fee iAt P
A
t for the design or patent
which is a prerequisite of production of innovative intermediate goods and a xed entry cost FCA.
R&D sector
In our semi-endogenous growth framework innovation corresponds to the discovery of a new variety
of producer durables that provides an alternative way to produce the nal good. The R&D sector
hires high-skilled labour (LA) and generates new designs according to the following knowledge
production function:
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A t = A
$
t 1A

t 1L

A; t; (22)
where we account for international R&D spillovers following Bottazzi and Peri (2007). Parameters
$ and  measure the foreign and domestic spillover e¤ects from the aggregate international and
domestic stock of knowledge (A and A) respectively. Negative values can be interpreted as the
"shing out" e¤ect, i.e. when innovation decreases with the level of knowledge, while positive values
refer to the "standing on shoulders" e¤ect and imply positive research spillovers. Note that  = 1
would give back the strong scale e¤ect feature of fully endogenous growth models with respect to
the domestic level of knowledge. Parameter  can be interpreted as total factor e¢ ciency of R&D
production, while  measures the elasticity of R&D production on the number of researchers (LA).
The international stock of knowledge grows exogenously at rate gAW . We assume that the R&D
sector is operated by a research institute which employs high skilled labour at their market rate
WH . We also assume that the research institute faces an adjustment cost of hiring new employees
and maximizes the following discounted prot-stream:
max
LA; t
1X
t=0
dt

PAt A t  WHt LA; t  
A
2
WHt L
2
A; t

(23)
where dt is the discount factor.
Trade and the current account
In order to facilitate aggregation we assume that private and government consumption (C;G) and
investment (I; IG) are aggregates of domestic and foreign varieties of nal goods, with preferences
expressed by the following CES utility function
Zi=

(1  sM ) 1  Zdi 1 + sM 1  Zf i 1  ( 1) (24a)
with Zi 2 Ci; Ii; Gi; IGi	 and Zdi and Zfi are indexes of demand across the continuum of
di¤erentiated goods produced respectively in the domestic economy and abroad, given by
Zdi =
24mdX
h=1

1
md
 1
d
Zd
i
h
d 1
d
35 
d
d 1
; Zf i =
24mfX
h=1

1
mf
 1
m
Zf
i
h
m 1
m
35 
m
m 1
: (24b)
The elasticity of substitution between bundles of domestic and foreign goods Zd
i
and Zf
i
is .
Thus aggregate imports are given by
IMt = s
M

PCt
P IMt

(Ct + It +Gt + IGt) (25)
P IMt = EtP

t (26)
Net foreign assets evolve according to
EtB
F
t = (1 + r
F
t )EtB
F
t 1 + P
EX
t EXt   P IMt IMt: (27)
Policy
On the expenditure side we assume that government consumption, government transfers and gov-
ernment investment are proportional to GDP and unemployment benets are indexed to wages
BENt =
X
s
bstW
s
t (1 NPART st   Lst ); (28)
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where the benet replacement rate bst can be indexed to consumer prices and net wages in di¤erent
degrees according to the following rule
bst = b^
s
t

(1 + tCt )P
C
t
c
(1  tWt )
w
; 0  c; w  1 (29)
The government provides subsidies (St) on physical capital and R&D investments in the form of a
tax-credit and depreciation allowances
St = t
K
t 1

KP It K
i;H
t 1 + 
APAt A
i;H
t 1

+ KP It J
i;H
t + 
APAt J
A;i;H
t : (30)
Government revenues RGt are made up of taxes on consumption as well as capital and labour income.
Government debt (Bt) evolves according to
Bt = (1 + rt)Bt 1 + PCt (Gt + IGt) + TRt +BENt + St  RGt   TLSt : (31)
We assume that a lump-sum tax (TLSt ) used for controlling the debt to GDP ratio according to the
following rule
TLSt = 
B

Bt 1
Yt 1Pt 1
  bT

+ DEF

Bt
YtPt

(32)
where bT is the government debt target.
Monetary policy is modelled via a standard Taylor rule, which allows for some smoothness of
the interest rate response to the ination and output gap
it = 
INOM
lag it 1 + (1   INOMlag )[rEQ + T +  INOM (Ct   T ) +  INOMy;1 ygapt 1]
+ INOMy;2 (tygapt+1   ygapt) + uINOMt (33)
The central bank has a constant ination target T and it adjusts interest rates whenever actual
consumer price ination deviates from the target and it also responds to the output gap. There is
also some inertia in nominal interest rate setting.
We use a measure that closely approximates the standard practice of output gap calculation as
used for scal surveillance and monetary policy (see Denis et al. (2006)), in which a production
function framework is used where the output gap is dened as deviation of capital and labour
utilisation from their long run trends. Therefore we dene the output gap as
Y GAPt =

ucapt
ucapsst
(1 )
Lt
Lsst

: (34)
where Lsst and ucap
ss
t are moving average steady state employment rate and capacity utilisation:
ucapsst = (1  ucap)ucapsst 1 + ucapucapt (35)
Lsst = (1  Lss)Lsst 1 + LssLt (36)
which we restrict to move slowly in response to actual values.
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